point of view, the context dependency of reported preferences indicates that the measurement methods used are inappropriate for assessing peoples' "true" preferences and need revision until context-independency is reached (if ever). In contrast, the "basic values" point of view suggests that it is the researcher's task to structure the instrument in a way that helps people in constructing meaningful preferences, e.g ., by drawing their attention to pertinent information, providing a relevant frame o f reference, and so on. Fischhoff and Furby's (1988) extensive discussion of things to do and not do in CV studies illustrates this approach.
In the specific case of CV research, however, the issues seem more complex than in the assessment of other preferences, lets say political preferences in an opinion survey.
Survey researchers, for example, want to assess whatever the opinion of people out there is, but are rarely concerned with the rationality of that opinion relative to some normative model. For them, the key criterion to validate reported preferences for a political candidate, for example, is actual voting behavior in an election. If people vote for the candidate for the "right" or "wrong" reasons is of no concern. Not so in the recent debate about CV responses. In this case, observing that a CV survey correctly predicts the outcome o f an actual referendum would not satisfy many o f the critics. Rather, the compatibility o f CV responses with normative economic models assumes crucial importance, shifting the criteria from how people vote on a referendum to whether they vote the way they do for the "right"
reason (see the discussions in Hausman, 1993) .
Although noneconomists may find it surprising that models that are known to be Contingent Valuation Surveys 5 wrong as descriptions of real economic behavior can serve as the gold standard for contingent economic behavior, addressing the intricacies of this issue is beyond the scope o f my expertise. Two issues, however, are crucial to the current debate and I shall address them
by drawing on what we know about how people answer survey questions. These issues are, that CV responses are (a) insensitive to factors that are deemed theoretically relevant, but (b) sensitive to factors that are deemed irrelevant. Taking a mental construal perspective, I
argue that proponents as well as opponents of current CV methods need to pay more attention to respondents' construal of the to-be-valued good. Based on related research in survey methodology and attitude measurement, I suggest that many apparently irrelevant features of the questionnaire implicitly provide information that is relevant to the valuation task, whereas much of the explicitly provided information may never find its way into respondents' representations of the good. Based on these considerations, I outline relevant research and discuss methodological implications. Before I turn to these issues, however, it is necessary to review the question answering process in surveys.
C ognition, C om m unication, and Survey M easurem ent That survey data are only as meaningful as the answers that respondents provide has long been recognized by survey researchers. Nevertheless, the cognitive and communicative processes that underlie question answering in the survey context have only recently received theoretical and empirical attention.
Drawing on psychological theories o f language comprehension, memory, and judgment, psychologists and survey methodologists have begun to formulate explicit models of the question answering process and have tested these models in laboratory experiments and split-ballot surveys. This work links survey methodologists' expertise in the "art of asking questions" to recent developments in cognitive and social
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psychology, thus providing a useful theoretical and empirical basis for understanding the processes by which survey respondents arrive at an answer (see the contributions in Hippier, Schwarz, & Sudman, 1987; Schwarz & Sudman, 1992 , 1994 Tanur, 1992) .
Much o f the work on cognitive aspects of survey responding has focused on attitude measurement and it is informative to highlight some of the differences between traditional attitude surveys and CV surveys. From a cognitive perspective, answering an attitude question requires that respondents solve several tasks, on which researchers have reached wide agreement (see, for example, Strack & Martin, 1987; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988) . Although these tasks are plausibly presented in a sequential order, the actual order in which respondents complete the tasks may occasionally differ from the assumed typical sequence.
Question Comprehension
As a first step, respondents have to interpret the question to understand what is meant.
If the question is ambiguous, respondents draw on the context of the question to disambiguate its meaning. Relevant contextual information includes the content of preceding questions (see Schuman & Presser, 1981; , for reviews) as well as apparently formal features of the questionnaire (see Schwarz, 1994 , for reviews). Not surprisingly, different substantive interpretations of a question result in different answers. What is more surprising to many researchers is that different substantive interpretations can be triggered by formal features of the questionnaire that are usually not supposed to influence question meaning.
As an example, suppose that respondents are asked to rate how successful they have been in life along a scale from "not at all successful" to "extremely successful." To answer provided, but an 11-point scale is an 11-point scale, no matter whether it presents 11 unnumbered boxes or numeric values that run from 1 to 11, from 0 to 10, or from -5 to + 5 .
Trying to make sense of the specific meaning of the verbal label, however, respondents may turn to such apparently irrelevant factors in interpreting the meaning of the question. Thus, we observed in several studies that "not at all successful" was interpreted as reflecting the absence of outstanding achievements when the rating scale ran from 0 ("not at all successful") to 10 ("very successful"), but was interpreted as reflecting the presence of explicit failure when the rating scale ran from -5 ("not at all successful") to + 5 ("very successful"), presenting 0 as the neutral midpoint. As a result of this differential interpretation of the verbal anchor, 34 percent of the respondents endorsed a value below the midpoint of the 0 to 10 scale, whereas only 13 percent endorsed one of the formally equivalent values of the -5 to -1-5 scale (Schwarz, Knauper, Hippier, Noelle-Neumann, & Clark, 1991) . As this example illustrates, design features that are often considered "nonsubstantive" may profoundly change the meaning of a question. As a result, many influences of apparently "irrelevant" features of questionnaire design can be traced to their impact on respondents understanding of the substantive meaning o f the question.
The use of contextual information that is reflected in such findings (see Schwarz, Contingent Valuation Surveys 8 1994 , for a review) is licensed by the tacit rules that govern the conduct of conversation in daily life, as described in G rice 's (1975) cooperativeness principle (see Clark & Schober, 1992; Schwarz, 1994; Strack & Schwarz, 1992 , for applications to survey research).
According to these tacit rules, "communicated information comes with a guarantee of relevance" as Sperber and Wilson (1986, p. vi) noted, and listeners interpret speakers' utterances on the assumption that the speaker is trying to be informative, relevant and clear.
If the speaker does not live up to these ideals, listeners may ask for clarification (which they are unlikely to get from the interviewer) or may use related contributions o f the speaker to determine the intended meaning. In the survey interview, the contributions of the researcher to the ongoing "conversation" include the content of preceding questions as well as formal features of the questionnaire, rendering them highly relevant as contextual information.
As in other domains of discourse, however, question comprehension requires more than an understanding of the literal meaning of the utterance. Rather, respondents have to identify the pragmatic meaning of the question to determine which information the questioner asks them to provide (Clark & Schober, 1992; Schwarz, 1994 govern the conduct of conversation in daily life (Grice, 1975) . These rules ask speakers to provide information that is "informative" for the recipient, rather than information that the recipient may take for granted anyway. Accordingly, information that seems self-evident, that may be assumed to "go without saying", or that has already been provided in response to a previous question is unlikely to be reported unless the researcher explicitly indicates that it is of interest (e.g., by presenting appropriate response alternatives). This hesitancy to report things that "go without saying" has potentially important implications for questions designed to check respondents' understanding of CV scenarios, as we shall see below.
Recall and Judgment
Once respondents made sense of an attitude question, they presumably recall the relevant opinion from memory. Or at least this is what attitude researchers usually hope for (in line with an articulated values philosophy), reflecting their disdain for what has often been called "door step opinions" in public opinion research. In most cases, however, respondents are unlikely to have a previously formed judgment accessible in memory, in particular a judgment that matches the specific aspects of the issue addressed in the question.
Accordingly, respondents need to "compute" a judgment on the spot (as assumed by a basic values philosophy). To do so, they draw on relevant information that is accessible at this point in time to form a mental representation of the target (see Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Tourangeau, 1992; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1987 Schwarz & Bless, 1992 , for a more detailed discussion). Accordingly, attitude researchers would like respondents to draw solely on chronically accessible information in forming a representation of the target. This follows from their desire to generalize from the opinions reported by their sample to the opinions of a population that has not been exposed to the context of the questionnaire. Accordingly, any influence of the information rendered accessible by the questionnaire is deemed undesirable because such influences would lead to context dependent reports that deviate from the opinions presumably held in the population.
W hat most researchers hope for in conducting a CV survey, on the other hand, seems quite different. In fully developed CV surveys (see Mitchell & Carson, 1989; Fischhoff & Furby, 1988) respondents are supposed to value a specific good that is described to them in considerable detail in the survey. In most cases, they have no experience with the good.
In fact, they are usually asked to value some imagined environmental change for which any previously computed value cannot be available. Accordingly, CV respondents are supposed to rely on the information provided in the questionnaire to arrive at a mental representation of the to-be-valued good. To the extent that they draw on information that is not contained in the scenario, they may construct a good that differs from the good the researcher wants them to value, rendering their reported WTP irrelevant to the goals of the study. Below, I
return to these issues in more detail. For the time being, however, I note that the procedures underlying fully developed CV surveys clearly follow a basic values philosophy (despite occasional disclaimers, see Mitchell & Carson, 1989 attitude researchers would do, respondents in these studies are provided with descriptions of the good of less than 10 words in length, aptly described as following "the headline method" (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994) . The better of these descriptions meet the criteria for good attitude questions and are sufficient to identify the issue, which should allow respondents to retrieve a previously formed preference, assuming such a preference is accessible. From a construal point of view, however, these descriptions provide insufficient specifications of the good, rendering it impossible to tell what exactly respondents are valuing.
Forming an evaluative judgment, however, does not only require a mental representation of the target of the question (the attitude object or good), but also a mental representation of some standard against which the target is evaluated. Much as the representation formed of the target, the representation formed of a standard is context dependent (Schwarz & Bless, 1992) and may include temporarily as well as chronically accessible information. In general, attitude researchers again hope that respondents draw primarily on chronically accessible information in constructing a relevant standard, for the reasons discussed above. In contrast, CV researchers frequently remind respondents o f other public goods to provide a framework for the valuation task, again reflecting a basic values approach.
As these comparisons indicate, it is the use of context dependent information, rendered accessible by the questionnaire, that is considered problematic in attitude measurement. In contrast, it is the use of context independent information that is considered problematic in CV surveys, although this issue is rarely addressed in these terms. . Below, I
address the implications of this perspective for different forms of WTP questions.
Reporting the Answer
Finally, respondents may wish to edit their response before they report it, due to influences of social desirability and situational adequacy (see DeMaio, 1984) . In this regard, attitudes as well as CV researchers attempt to safeguard against influences o f social desirability and survey methodologists developed various procedures that reduce these influences (see Sudman & Bradburn, 1983) .
Modes of Data Collection
In summary, interpreting the question, generating an opinion, formatting the response,
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and editing the answer are the main psychological components of a process that starts with respondents' exposure to a survey question and ends with their overt report. Several aspects of this process are influenced by the mode of data collection used, resulting in differences between face-to-face or telephone interviews and self-administered questionnaires (see Schwarz, Strack, Hippier, & Bishop, 1991) . In the final section of this paper, I address some of the relevant mode differences and their implications for the use o f mail surveys in contingent valuation research.
Mental Representations and Scope Effects:
What are Respondents Valuing?
"According to consumer theory, for any good, more of that good is preferred to less.
Therefore, a scenario offering a higher level of services should yield a higher value" (Desvouges, Hudson, & Ruby, 1994, p. 8) , at least if the good has positive marginal utility.
Much of the recent debate has focused on the extent to which the responses obtained in CV surveys meet this assumption of economic theorizing. Several studies demonstrated that reported WTP can be insensitive to variations in the scope of the described good, whereas others observed satisfactory sensitivity (see Carson & Mitchell, 1993, in press , for reviews).
The crucial question is what demonstrations of insensitivity to scope actually demonstrate:
that a given specific survey instrument is insensitive or that CV methodology in general is insensitive to scope? Whereas the former conclusion suggests that the specific instrument needs improvement, the latter conclusion suggests that respondents' valuations may be based on processes that are incompatible with the economic framework that provides the theoretical justification for CV methods (see Mitchell, 1993 and Knetsch, 1992, for opposing perspectives).
In addressing this question, we face the usual problems involved in interpreting null results, in particular in the presence of other studies that obtained the predicted differences.
Psychologists' usual response to null results is to demonstrate (a) that the appropriate experimental conditions have been realized, based on proper manipulation checks, and/or (b)
that some other dependent variable shows a pattern that plausibly supports that the experimental manipulation was successful. In the absence of such evidence, psychologists usually refrain from drawing substantive conclusions from null results. Note, however, that making a case for the interpretability of null results does not require more than demonstrating the successful realization of the experimental conditions and appropriate statistical power.
As Fischhoff (this conference) noted, some CV researchers advocate standards that raise the cost of methodological studies to a level that renders basic research unfeasible. Whereas these criteria may be appropriate for damage assessments, where the absolute value o f WTP is of key interest, many of them (including representativeness, sample size, and related variables) are overly restrictive for methodological studies interested in relative differences between experimental conditions. What, however, does it take to demonstrate that differences in scope have been successfully realized in a scenario? At the minimum, it requires a manipulation check that indicates that respondents do indeed expect that (a) different quantities of (b) the same quality of the described good will (c) be delivered with equal likelihood, if proper payment is provided. This requires that respondents understand the differences in quantity conveyed in the scenario; that their mental construal of the good is not more or less inclusive than intended in the scenario; that the scope does not affect the perceived likelihood of delivery or the perceived quality of what is delivered; and so on (see Fischhoff & Furby, 1988, for an extensive discussion of relevant criteria). Unfortunately, it is unclear to what extent such
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Contingent Valuation Surveys 15 prerequisites were met in many of the better known demonstrations o f embedding effectsas well as in the studies that demonstrated sensitivity to differences in scope.
Do Respondents Understand the Description of Scope?
Obviously, differences in scope described in the scenario will only affect the obtained responses if they find their way into respondents' own mental representations of the good.
This requires that respondents notice the scope described in the scenario and that this description makes sense to them. In general, respondents assume that the space and time allocated to an issue in the questionnaire reflects its relative importance (Fischhoff & Furby, 1988; Schwarz, 1994) . Accordingly, scope information needs to be elaborated on, rather than mentioned in passing, and respondents' attention needs to be drawn to it.
To illustrate this rather trivial point, consider two studies reported by Desvouges et al. (1993) and Schkade and Payne (1993) , based on the same scenarios. Using a self administered questionnaire in a mall intercept survey, Desvouges et al. asked respondents to value a program that would prevent the deaths of either 2,000, 20,000, or 200,000 migratory waterfowl from oil ponds in the Rocky Mountain fly way. Respondents were further informed that 2,000 birds represent "much less" than 1% of the population, 20,000 birds "less" than 1%, and 200,000 birds "about 2%". The results showed that the described scope had no impact on reported WTP, which seems surprising if one draws on differences in the absolute number of birds involved, but not if one draws on the minor differences in the percentage o f birds involved. Interestingly, however, the difference between 2,000 and 200,000 birds resulted in differential median WTP values of $25 and $50, respectively (or $25 and $60, p = .11, when zero answers were excluded) when Schkade and Payne used exactly the same scenario, but asked respondents to think aloud while answering the
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questions. Although these differences failed to reach significance with the small sample size used, the pattern of WTP suggests that the think-aloud task fostered attention to detail, resulting in the elaboration of the scope information provided.
As this example illustrates, scope information requires appropriate encoding, which needs to be ensured by procedures that draw respondents' attention to scope information and encourage its active elaboration. This may be accomplished by questions that stimulate respondents to draw on the scope information during the information acquisition phase and to incorporate scope information in their mental representations of the good. That this can be accomplished even for information that is notoriously difficult to convey, such as information about low-level risks, has been successfully demonstrated in several studies (e.g., Mitchell & Carson, 1986) . Simply observing that scope information does not affect reported W TP, however, is insufficient to challenge CV methodology at a basic level as the observed insensitivity may always reflect an unsuccessful manipulation that should be addressed in a revision of the instrument.
Inclusive Representations
A different problem arises when differences in scope are introduced by respondents' implicit assumptions about the intervention that is supposed to provide the relevant good.
This problem increases with respondents' knowledge about the content domain and decreases, at least to some extent, with the explicitness of the scenario. As an illustration, consider the construals of highly sophisticated respondents in a study reported by Schulze, McClelland, and Lazo (1994) . According to economic models, the jointly assessed value o f preserving a species of blue winged and a species of green winged butterflies in the Amazon rain forest should be equivalent to the sum of the values assigned to preserving only the blue winged The only way to save one species is to save all of them by saving the forest as well" (Schulze et al. 1994, p. 16 ).
As a result, respondents' representation o f the to-be-valued good includes much more than the butterfly species that is to be saved, resulting, in the present case, in a valuation of the complete forest along with an unknown number of other species. Not surprisingly, asking these respondents to value the preservation o f several species in the same habitat does not result in higher W TP, reflecting that the valuation of any species includes the value o f all other species given the respondents' mental model of the content domain.
To which extent such joint valuations underlie non-additive valuations is an empirical (Clark, 1985) . To return to Schulze et a l.'s (1994) example, a respondent who assumes that butterflies can only be saved by saving their habitat, may also assume that the researcher, who is presumably an expert on the issue, shares this obvious insight. When asked, she may hence respond that she valued the butterfly species, taking it for granted that this implies whatever it obviously takes to reach the goal. One way to address this issue is to explore respondents' reasoning processes in think-aloud studies during the pretesting phase and to develop specific queries for inclusion in the main survey. Much as in the case of the "What-have-you-done-today?" example discussed above, such specific probes would be likely to uncover assumptions that respondents take for granted, although these assumptions would not be reported in response to a more general question.
Scope and Certainty of Provision
Similar concerns apply to assessments of the scenario's plausibility and the perceived likelihood that the promised good is actually provided. As Fischhoff and Furby (1988, p. 162) noted, "Agreeing to a proposed transaction involves an exchange o f promises: to deliver a good and to make a payment. As a result, two defining aspects of any agreement are the probabilities of each promise being kept. The less likely a good is to be received, the less an offer to provide it should be valued."
In general, CV researchers want respondents to assume that provision o f the good is certain. To the extent that respondents' perceived likelihood of provision is lower, they undervalue the good relative to the researcher's intended interpretation of the scenario.
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Although the perceived certainty of provision is affected by many aspects of the scenario (see Mitchell & Carson, 1989) , a particularly crucial one is the described scope: The larger the scope, the less likely it may seem that the promised good is actually delivered. Tempting as an investment plan that promises an annual return of 200% may be, we are likely to put more money into a more conservative plan, reflecting that exaggerated promises raise doubts -in particular if the relevant mechanism of provision does not strike one as plausible.
Similar concerns may apply to a plan that promises, for example, to "Rehabilitate all recently released criminals," as opposed to "Rehabilitate recently released young offenders" (see Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992, p. 65 , for relevant examples). To the extent that the certainty of provision seems lower in the former case than in the latter, we shouldn't expect that people pay more for the former plan.
In considering respondents' perception of the certainty o f provision it is helpful to distinguish between the provision of the promised intervention and the provision o f the good that the intervention is supposed to produce or protect. As the rehabilitation example illustrates, both are likely to be affected by scope. On the one hand, the implementation of a rehabilitation program directed at all released criminals may seem less realistic than a program directed at the smaller subset of young offenders. On the other hand, respondents may assume that "young offenders" are more likely to be successfully rehabilitated than seasoned "criminals", as may already be indicated by the respective terms. If so, they may assume that the smaller program delivers more for the money than the larger program. wire, as opposed to, lets say, replacing the complete engine. And although the outcome is the same -your car is running again -your reaction to a $800 bill is likely to be very different in these two cases. As this example illustrates* our willingness to pay is not only determined by the outcome, but also by our assessment o f the fair cost o f producing that outcome.
Nevertheless, information about the amount of money it takes to produce a good is usually not explicitly provided in CV scenarios, for theoretical as well as practical reasons.
In the case o f natural resource damage assessments, the scenario is only supposed to serve as a vehicle that provides a plausible framework for eliciting the valuation o f a good (e.g., a clean beach) that the plan is supposed to protect. In terms of the above car example, it is the running car that is to be valued, not the repair effort. Much as in the car example, however, respondents are likely to consider "how much it takes" to produce the outcome, in addition to the outcome itself.
As Schkade and Payne (1993, p. 283 ) observed on the basis of think-aloud protocols, "Perhaps the most common strategy in our sample involved first acknowledging that something should be done and then trying to figure out how much an appropriate amount would be." To determine the "appropriate amount", respondents are likely to consider cost information, resulting in increasing WTP with increasing cost estimates. To arrive at a cost estimate, respondents have two relevant sources of information, namely the complexity of the scenario and the $-■value of the WTP question. Thus, scenarios that describe more extended plans, involving, for example, ten rather than one escort ships, are likely to convey higher cost and may hence be likely to produce higher W TP -even under conditions where the same alleged outcome is described. A more directly relevant source o f information, however, is provided by the $-value presented in a referendum question. In general, respondents assume that the numeric values provided as part of a question reflect the researcher's expert knowledge about the issue under study (see for a review of relevant research). From this perspective, the $-value o f the WTP question conveys the experts' cost estimate for the described plan. essentially anticipating what the study is supposed to reveal. As suggested by Schkade and Payne's (1993) protocols, respondents may first determine if something needs to be done and may then try "to figure out how much an appropriate amount would be" (p. 283). If they interpret the referendum question as reflecting the experts' estimate o f the contribution that it takes to meet the cost, this latter task is relatively easy, reducing the decision to whether one is willing, and able, to contribute one's share towards the provision of a collective good.
That respondents take such a cost sharing perspective is suggested by Schkade and Payne's (1993) protocols as well as by data reported by Green, Kahneman, and Kunreuther (1994) . Schkade and Payne (1993, p. 283) , for example, observed that "41% o f the sample mentioned the idea that, if everyone did their part, each household would not have to give all that much. In fact, respondents who used this reasoning did give substantially lower W TPs." This theme is reiterated in Green et a l.'s (1994) findings. Respondents in their study were asked to report their WTP for a program to teach English to immigrants to the United States. Some respondents were informed that 20 million other households would be asked the same question, whereas other respondents did not receive this information. Those whose attention was drawn to the large number of other households asked, were more likely to offer some payment, but the payment they did offer was lower than the payment offered by those who did not receive this information. Apparently, respondents who were aware that 20 million households would be asked to make a contribution inferred that each household's contribution could be relatively small. This finding suggests that respondents were willing
to pay "what it takes", at least within limits, but certainly not more than it takes.
Although these findings are nicely compatible with a contribution model of CV measurement, as Green et al. (1994) suggest, they are not necessarily incompatible with a Contingent Valuation Surveys 25 purchase model. To return to the car example, suppose that your repair bill includes $100
to cover the mechanic's trip to your car. Would your response to this charge differ if the mechanic also repaired three additional cars that broke down within a few yards, charging each one $100 for the trip? It seems that considerations of cost sharing may be as important in a purchase frame as in a contribution frame.
Conclusions
In summary, the conjectures offered here bear on the concern that "CV responses are sensitive to methodological factors that, from the standpoint of economic theory, are irrelevant" (Schkade & Payne, 1993, p. 273) , such as the specific format of the elicitation question used. From a psychological point of view, the key assumption of this argument is mistaken: Far from reflecting formal, methodological features without substantive relevance, different forms of the elicitation question provide different information that respondents actively use in solving a complex task. Much as many formal aspects of attitude questions, such as the numeric values of a rating scale (Schwarz, Knâuper, et al., 1991) have been found to change the substantive meaning of the question, so do different elicitation formats provide more than exchangeable "measurement devices." Whereas future systematic evidence bearing on these conjectures may put the concern to rest that CV responses are sensitive to "irrelevant" factors, these conjectures raise a potentially more troublesome concern by suggesting that the referendum questions recommended by the NOAÀ panel predetermine respondents' valuations by providing implicit cost information.
Mode of Data Collection
Survey responses are to some extent affected by the mode of data collection used. This
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reflects, in part, that face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews and self-administered questionnaires pose somewhat different cognitive tasks (see Schwarz, Strack, Hippier, & Bishop, 1991 , for a detailed discussion) and that these modes of data collection provide differential opportunities for respondent self-selection. Below I address two key differences between (face-to-face or telephone) interviews and mail questionnaires that seem particularly relevant to CV surveys, namely respondent self-selection and the degree to which the researcher can control respondents' exposure to relevant information. In combination, these two factors argue against the use of mail surveys in CV research.
Exposure to Information
One of the key differences between self-administered questionnaires and face-to-face or telephone interviews is that self-administered questionnaires provide no control over the extent to which respondents understand the material presented to them and the order in which questions are read (see . As several studies indicated, an unknown proportion of respondents is likely to read parts or all of the questionnaire before filling in an answer, resulting in influences of subsequent questions on answers given to preceding questions. In addition, relevant issues may be discussed within the household, introducing other influences that are difficult to identify. For CV surveys, this lack of control has several potentially problematic implications. questionnaire, whereas Desvouges et al. (1993) did not when they administered the questionnaire without a think-aloud requirement illustrates this point. On the other hand, respondents who are sufficiently interested in the topic have more time to think about the scenario under self-administered conditions than they would under interview conditions. At the extreme, they may return to the questionnaire at a later time, discuss it with others, gather additional information, and so on. Such an increased elaboration o f the scenario is only likely for highly motivated respondents and its specific impact on WTP is likely to depend on how plausible the scenario seems, once one scrutinizes its details.
Second, to the extent that respondents read ahead, their interpretation of the scenario may be affected by their knowledge of the questions that follow it, including the $-value mentioned in the WTP question or the manipulation checks that ask them if they believed the information that was presented in the scenario. At present, it is unclear what the exact implications of knowing these questions are, but it seems likely that knowing the $-value affects the encoding of the scenario and that reading the manipulation checks may raise doubts about the reliability of the information offered.
Third, the possibility to discuss the issue with other household members or to gather more information may introduce information that is not contained in the scenario, further affecting respondents' construal of the to-be-valued good.
As these possibilities illustrate, mail survey conditions render it even more difficult to determine what respondents are actually valuing than interview surveys, reflecting that the researcher has less control over respondents' exposure to relevant information. Note, however, that some of these potential problems are of less concern when self-administered questionnaires are used under controlled laboratory conditions, where respondents may be discouraged from reading ahead and have to complete the questionnaire without interruption.
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Accordingly, self-administered questionnaires are a feasible instrument for basic research under controlled administration conditions, although their use under the uncontrollable conditions of mail surveys cannot be recommended.
Respondent Self-Selection
Adding to the above problems, mail surveys are particularly prone to respondent self selection, as Schuman (1994) noted. This follows from the simple fact that mail survey respondents can screen the questionnaire before they decide to participate, whereas face-toface and telephone surveys do not provide this opportunity. As a result, nonresponse in interview surveys reflects the impact of variables that are unrelated to the specific content of the survey, whereas nonresponse in mail surveys is, to an unknown degree, affected by content. Hence, mail surveys are likely to overrepresent individuals who find the topic interesting and important.
Although this issue becomes less problematic as the response rate o f mail surveys increases, self-selection problems remain even at high response rates. As an illustration, suppose that a mail and a telephone survey both obtain an 80% response rate. In the telephone survey, the 20% nonresponse includes participants who refuse because they are called at a bad time, are on vacation, or whatever. However, it does not include respondents who thought about the issue and decided it is not worth their time. In contrast, mail respondents can work on the questionnaire at a time of their choice, thus potentially reducing nonresponse due to timing problems. On the other hand, however, they have the possibility to screen the questionnaire and are more likely to participate in the survey if they find the issue of interest. As a result, an identical nonresponse rate of 20% under both modes is likely to be unrelated to the topic under interview conditions, but not under mail conditions.
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Hence, similar response rates under different modes do not necessarily indicate comparable samples.
Moreover, the variable that drives self-selection under mail conditions is respondents' interest in the topic, which may be only weakly related to sociodemographic variables.
Accordingly, topic driven self-selection may be present even if the completed sample seems representative with regard to sociodemographic variables like age, sex, income, and so on.
To assess problems of topic related self-selection, one needs to assess respondents' interest in the topic. The current considerations predict that mail surveys include a higher percentage of respondents who report high interest than face-to-face or telephone surveys, even if the samples are comparable on sociodemographic grounds. If this differential self-selection results in an over-or underestimation of WTP, however, is difficult to determine because interest in the topic may reflect favorable as well as unfavorable attitudes towards the issue.
In combination with the lack of control over respondents' understanding o f the provided information, the problem of topic related self-selection renders mail surveys unfeasible for CV research. 
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